The naval bombardment of Genoa (codenamed Operation Grog, Grog operation in English) took place on the morning of 9 February 1941 by the Royal Navy; this was the second and last attack by sea and suffered the Ligurian capital after the French took place on 14 June of the previous year.
Although the main objective was Genoa, the British military operation was more extensive and also included a slight aerial bombardment of the ports of Pisa, Livorno, and La Spezia at the hands of Fairey Swordfish torpedo bombers aboard the aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal. From that day until the end of the war in Italy, the city suffered more heavy attacks, but only aircraft.
Premises
With the declaration of war on France and Britain, the Italian peninsula underwent a long series of attacks directed against its allies. An industrial city, it was the most important city for the duration of World War II, and in the course of the conflict, the industrial city of Genoa was heavily bombed for the presence of significant shipyards and metallurgical industries. The first attack by sea took place just four days after the declaration of war by a French fleet at the helm of Admiral Emile-Andre Duplat, which bombed the production centers of Genoa and Savona by sea but caused minor damage.
Then followed a series of air strikes in the summer of 1940, but after the surrender of France (24 June 1940), the task of hitting the Ligurian centers and those of the rest of the peninsula touched British naval air forces. Based on the logic of these bombing operations, the British decided to take forceful action against the shores of the city of Genoa.
After the “Night of Taranto” on 11-November 12, 1940, when the Italian fleet had been heavily damaged by a torpedo bomber attack by the British, the remaining fleet was moved to Naples on Jan. 8 and, in turn, was bombed. The battleship Giulio Cesare was slightly damaged, and the next day, she was transferred to Genoa for repairs and then, at the end of January 1941, in La Spezia.
Since much of the Italian fleet was transferred to the bases of the Tyrrhenian Sea, the English thought of a bomb of such bases to give a signal to the Royal Navy that even in the high Tyrrhenian Sea, Italian ships would be safe. It was chosen as the target port of Genoa because it was believed that there were three ships under repair battle - the Julius mentioned above, Caesar, the Littorio, and Caio Duilio. In fact, there was only the second, heavily damaged in the “night of Taranto,” but even after they learned of this particular, the British decided to proceed with the operation.
Meanwhile, the British secret service had learned that on February 12 on the Italian Riviera in Genoa, there would be a meeting between Benito Mussolini and Franco, in which the Duce would try to convince Franco to enter the war on the side of the ‘Axis. If Spain had entered the war, Gibraltar would have fallen, and the entire Mediterranean would have been under the rule of the Axis.
To prevent at all costs the Spanish government did such a step, it was necessary to demonstrate the weakness of Italy, unable even to protect their coastline, and on the direct orders of the same Churchill in the afternoon of February 6 from Gibraltar, made sail Force H towards the Ligurian coast.
The bombardment of Genoa, designed as a military operation, thus became a political issue and therefore had to take place before February 12. Also, rumors collected by the British secret service prospettavano hypothesis (proved false) of an Italian landing in the Balearics would still put Gibraltar within the reach of medium-range bombers Axis.
The First Movements
On February 2, 1941, Supermarina (the Italian naval high command based in Rome) raised alarm in the team that was in La Spezia as a result of the violent bombardment which had been subjected to the port of Naples. Meanwhile, on January 31, Force H, under the command of ‘Admiral James Somerville Fownes, sailed from Gibraltar, and on the same February 2, approaching the west coast of Sardinia, a few planes from the aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal parties attacked with torpedoes the dam of Tirso in Sardinia.
The Ark Royal was equipped at the time with 30 Fairey Swordfish, 12 Blackburn Skua, 12 Fairey Fulmar, belonging to the Squadrons 800, 807, 810 and 820 of the Fleet Air Arm, with 807 bombers equipped with Blackburn Skua, the 810 and of the 820 bombers / Swordfish torpedo bombers and 807 fighter/reconnaissance aircraft Fairey Fulmar.
The British intended to head the next night to Genoa, where they were to arrive the following day, but the worsening weather conditions until the storm caused significant delays to navigation. Realizing that, due to bad weather, the ships would come near Genoa in the afternoon (may therefore be spotted by patrols Italian,) Admiral Somerville was forced to cancel the operation and return to Gibraltar (not it is unlikely that it had been a fake in view of the impending action against Genoa).
A consequence of adverse weather conditions was a significant amount of damage suffered by the destroyer escort, which forced them to make hasty repairs in Gibraltar necessary to participate in the new attack set for February 20, the date chosen in order to achieve the policy objective of the mission-related the date of the meeting between Franco and Mussolini.
Somerville did not have much choice, having already been accused of poor resourcefulness against the Italian fleet in the previous battle of Capo Teulada and submitted to a disciplinary committee; the investigation exonerated him, but without an apparent success of his career would have been jeopardized.
Force H sailed again from Gibraltar on February 6, heading west as if to get out of the Mediterranean, then reversed course at night in order to confuse Italian agents under observation at Algeciras. However, Supermarina understood the maneuver, and 7 made sail from Messina the Cruiser Division III (Trieste, Trento, and Bolzano) directed towards La Spezia, and on the 8th day, churches that were intensified as a survey to locate the British team.
Had news that British ships of Force H from Gibraltar were approaching the Italian coast, a naval force commanded by Angelo Iachino and formed by Julius Caesar from Andrea Doria and the Vittorio Veneto, with the stock of X and XIII Squadron, went out to sea in search of the enemy.
The fleet was to meet the following day at the Asinara 50 miles west of Cape Testa, with the cruisers from Messina (with the escort of destroyers XI Squadron). Convinced that the objective of the British was Sardinia, given the failure of the enemy a few days before, it was thought a repetition of the attack against the dam of Tirso.
Another hypothesis was that of a launch aircraft to Malta, and also assumed the presence of the British fleet in the south of Sardinia, as revealed in a telephone conversation between Iachino and Inigo Samples (Chief of Staff of the Navy) to 17 of day 7, the task of the Italian team was left to “attack the enemy, but only under favorable conditions” and return to port in the absence of contact for the morning of 9. According to the memories of Iachino, the hypothesis was formulated as a target of Genoa, but let it drop “date night the moon and the position of the English fleet to the south of the Balearic Islands.”
The Italian aircraft sightings of day 8 were not significant because the survey was not designed to the north of the Balearic Islands, so although it was reported the presence of fighter planes in flight south of the Balearic Islands. He deduced the presence of an aircraft carrier was not suggested as a possible route of the British battle in the high Tyrrhenian Sea.
This news was then communicated to the Italian team in navigation, confirming the possible presence of Force H southwest of Sardinia for the 9th morning. During the night, between 8 and 9, heavy traffic intercepted telegraphic English, but it was not possible radiogoniometrarlo. At about 3 in the morning, the two teams went northwest of Calvi (Corsica), less than 30 miles away, without avvistarsi, while the English team was aiming for Genoa undisturbed.
According to the war diary of the ‘Oberkommando der Marine (OKM - High Command of the Navy), German Italian, although the scouts on day 8 were not able to sight the ships of the British fleet of Admiral Iachino was sent by Supermarina to cross west of the north-western Sardinia, with orders to direct first westward and then, returning to the north, to bring in the channel between Corsica and the French coast, 100 miles west of Cap Corse, in the position defined by the coordinates. These coordinates were communicated by Supermarina representative of the German Navy in Rome, Admiral Eberhard Weichold, and sent by OKM, which brought them back in the war diary.
The Attack On The City
In the early morning of February 9, some aircraft reconnaissance was spotted over the skies of the city. Still, until that time, Genoa had suffered three air raids and a naval and had been placed on alert forty-six times and twenty times in a state of pre-alarm. So, the presence of British aircraft to act as surveillance was nothing new for the people, but this time, the planes would not have taken photos but addressed the pull of naval artillery.
At 5 in the morning of the 9th, the Ark Royal, escorted by destroyers Duncan, Encounter, and Isis, diverted eastward, positioning itself 70 miles off the coast of La Spezia to allow twenty Swordfish bombers to Leghorn, Pisa, and La Spezia, at 07: 19 Group 1 was in view of Portofino, and at 07:33 he was spotted by a motor sailer that was part of the chain of anti-aircraft sighting, which refers to “four Italian torpedo boats with route north-west” to his command of Genoa, which must have been aware of the presence of any naval units girlfriends in those waters but did not report anything to Supermarina and at the same time the Ark Royal aircraft began bombing of Livorno and La Spezia.
The command marina of La Spezia, instead of Supermarina, reported the presence of naval aircraft, but “do not drop bombs,” and in fact, were those dropped magnetic mines to deter the exit of the team from the battle. Still, it was already at sea; the resulting logical hypothesis made by the command marina of La Spezia was the presence of an aircraft carrier. No alarm was given to the team battle.
The rest of the team - the battleships Renown and Malaya, the cruiser Sheffield, and the destroyers Firedrake, Jupiter, Jersey, Fury, Foresight, Foxhound, and Fearless - at 7:50 retreated to the west and began to Defilade about twenty kilometers from the coast. At 08:01, the British education was sighted 12 miles off the coast of Portofino from the traffic light, which passed on the information to the command navy of Genoa, who informed them only at 08:25 Supermarina and to inform the bombing; it took 08 hours: 37.
At 07:35, Genoa was placed on alert while three of the Ark Royal aircraft were brought to the city to guide the roll of the big guns. At 08:14 on 9 February 1941, Admiral Somerville gave the order to open fire. British ships of the 1st group of Force H opened fire from about 19 kilometers away from the city of Genoa, firing 273 shots from 381 mm, 782 rounds of 152 mm, as well as numerous other smaller calibers.
The Renown was the first to open fire, first shelling the Pier Principe Umberto Ansaldo shipyards and then moving to shoot on the banks of Polcevera, firing a total of 125 projectiles caliber 381 and 450 caliber 114; Malaya aimed the dry docks and targets nearby shooting around 148 shots from 381 mm; Sheffield fired on industrial installations located on the left bank of the Polcevera around 782 bullets from 152 mm.
From the ground, returned fire without any significant result due to fog, the battery Mameli Pegli with 14 shots from 152/50, the armed train No. 5 stationed at Voltri with 23 shots from 152/40, the pontoon armed GM-269 with 10 strokes with a 190/39 and GM-194, which due to a fault in the electrically fired only three shots from 381/40. The attack ended after just half an hour, and the response of coastal defenses was ineffective, with the extent of their coastal gauges insufficient against the mighty range of the guns of the British ships.
After the action of the British ships veered and began a quiet return trip to the base, 09:45, all aircraft, except one shot down in the sky of Tirrenia, were again on the Ark Royal after bombarding Pisa and Livorno.
The Damage
The initial objectives of the bombing were the Ansaldo shipyards and factories that were located on both sides of Polcevera. Still, its numerous fires and smoke forced the British to move the shot to the commercial dock, then other shots reached the power plant and dry docks and finally hit the tanker that Andrew was coming into port.
They also affected many civil and historians as the cathedral of San Lorenzo - in which a 381 mm projectile, after having drilled two main walls, came to rest on the floor unexploded - the church of the Madeleine, the ‘Academy ligustica, l’ hospital Duchess of Galliera - where they found the death of 17 hospitalized - some buildings at the beginning of Via XX Settembre el ‘State Archives. One of the areas most affected was that of Piazza Colombo, which shortly after changed its name to “Square on February 9″ and then resumed after the war the old name.
Many British bullets fell into the water (about 50%), 55 of which were steamers in the port. They were damaged by shrapnel 29, while the steamer Salpi received direct hits (two of which one 381 mm), and the steamer Garibaldi, which was in dry dock, instead reported three rips in the forward part of the hull as a result of a shot exploded within the basin, the more damage it had the training ship which sank Garaventa.
In contrast, the two military ships in port for repairs at the time, Caio Duilio and the destroyer Bersagliere, were not affected. Minor damage was suffered to industrial plants but reported significant damage to buildings. Civilians, where at the end of the attack, were killed while 144 people were injured 272.
The material damage was enormous and social; the town had to provide to stay at hotels and guest houses for around 2,500 homeless people, supplying food and lodging for 2,781,218 pounds, cash aid for 955,289 lire, clothes, shoes, various clothing for 692,044 lire, articles kitchen and household goods for 315,374 lire, vacation 77,765. At the same time, the “Deposit of the Podestà” collected 1,472,649 pounds, to which a million pounds of contribution required by Mussolini himself was added. Tens of houses in the old town were also a victim of slumping back to the bombing.
The Belated Reaction Italian
Neither the Air Force nor the coastal defense system failed to counter the attack of Genoa. The command marina of La Spezia, then, was soon in branching the signal sighting of the enemy formation. The first information on the bombing (“Alarms aircraft probably coming from offshore of La Spezia and the Liguria area”) reached the Italian team in the navigation only at 09:50 when it was the meeting with the Third Division to the west dell.
Iachino was in this position since first taking an initiative was not supported by the orders received, which indicated to direct towards the west, and justifying it with the arrival of a signal, which stated “The Tirzo is in alarm,” which he later changed in his writings in “air raid” instead of reaching with the 6th meridian west route had directed just to the south-east dell, believing that the British fleet he was on that side.
The transmission went back an hour ago, but the encryption and decryption of the message Italians had made him lose a lead of about thirty miles in the right direction for the benefit of the British team, even if he was wearing basic information: there was an aircraft carrier at sea within the range of naval aircraft from La Spezia and Livorno. However, the carrier did not break the radio silence and continued en route to the west. A new message, Supermarina at 09:37, deciphered at 09:50, informed Iachino.
No indication was given on the possible route of escape of the British team. Admiral Iachino recently operated the union and went straight to the north, at full speed, to cut the road to the enemy. Still, the contact between the two squadrons, also due to the visibility conditions highly variable and complicated dall’avvistamento around Menorca, has a fleet of French steamers, did not happen.
At about 14:30, the two squadrons went back to about thirty miles without seeing each other, with the English course west-south-east and the Italian direct north-northeast where it was supposed to be the Force H. This erroneous reporting prevented the meeting and the following naval battle; however, it failed and, above all the support of the Royal Air Force that, given the proximity of the bases, would have to intervene heavily.
An idroricognitore took over the British team for 12 hours but was shot down before it could run the signal of discovery. Two aircraft, Fiat BR20 of the 43 º Stormo, sighted the naval training at 12:20, attacking with bombs without success but did report a sighting only on their return to the base, and the news was only branched at 15:30.
The British aircraft carrier shot down two other Italian reconnaissance aircraft. In spite of this, the 60 scouts Italo-German bombers and 107 used by the Axis powers in the Gulf of Genoa and the stretch Sea between Corsica and the French coast at the height of Toulon during the February 9, throughout the day communicated only four sightings, what’s more wrong.
There was, therefore, a large amount of aircraft that polarized their attention in the waters in which it was the Force H, but, incredibly, there were on the same only four sightings by nine bombers BR20 of the 43 º Stormo, two of which were attacked. At the same time, the other seven felt that the British ships, sighted on three occasions, they were Italian.
In a report, errors sighted by the crews of the nine BR20 bombers were justified by the commander of the 43rd Wing, Colonel This, as follows:
Iachino meanwhile took the course to 330 ° 12:44, having regard to its current position leading the team to battle Italian in the direction of Toulon, in its route converged with the British team, at 13; however, a new e-Supermarina warned him that had been sighted an enemy team to the north-west of Cape Corso, and the Italian team reversed course at speeds of 24 knots to intercept it.
At 15:38 from the cruiser, Trieste spotted the supposed enemy. Still, ten minutes later, the ships were identified as a convoy of seven French merchants whose presence in the area had been duly notified Italians in compliance with the armistice conditions.
At that point, the British fleet was already far away and would be subjected to an unnecessary search up at 09:07 on the 10th, when the Italian team was given the order to return to Naples, as in La Spezia was still ongoing. Mine clearance operations of British naval. The French convoy was also the subject of airstrikes, without success, and the same happened to MAS 510 and 525 exchanged by SM79 8 º Stormo bombers to enemy cruisers; even the Luftwaffe just arrived in Sardinia could not find track of Allied ships in spite of the research carried out.
The Consequences
The British attributed the success of Operation Grog to the meticulous care with which they had prepared the action, in addition to their preparation. Still, there is no doubt that they played for a number of favorable circumstances. Although the results were poor soldiers, the bombing significantly influenced the morale of the population of Genoa, but not only.
It was from the political point of view that the transaction Grog had the most success getting what was probably its primary purpose: to put pressure on Generalissimo Francisco Franco, who was supposed to meet with Mussolini in Bordighera three days later, on the unfortunate choice to get against Great Britain. Following the refusal of the Spanish dictator to side with the Axis, the proposed transaction Felix, with which the Germans wanted to occupy Gibraltar.
The parties, in their war bulletins, described the facts and recited the Italian.
This was the final narrative report, “The People of Genoa on the Agenda of the Nation,” that chorused in the days to follow numerous titles in propaganda newspapers. In any case, the bombardment of Genoa aroused a huge impression across the nation, especially after learning that the action had cost the enemy the slightest loss.
Much More Along The Bulletin British
Seven days later, the church of San Siro celebrated a mass in memory of the victims, which was attended by all the central city authorities and a considerable crowd that occupied not just those responsible for public order but also On February 18, a special train from Florence came to Genoa Princess Maria José, nurse in uniform.
After a brief stop at the Royal Palace, he went to visit the wounded in the hospitals and the citizens in the most affected areas. Still, it is said that during his visit to the Princess of Piedmont, he mainly found closed and hostile faces between hospitals and in the streets, a sign that the population of Genoa began to resent the war despite the propaganda of newspapers and radio waves that poured over the city in the days to follow.
In memory of that on February 9, when he saw the “Dominant” at the mercy of the British navy, the projectile 381 mm artillery remained in the cathedral of San Lorenzo was placed in the right aisle, near the entrance, with the following inscription:
Serious was also the result within the Royal Navy since the first charges were formulated to Iachino at the same time to return to port the morning of the 11th when Admiral Riccardi said in a telephone conversation why he failed to Iachino intercept the British team. Immediately, he replied that he had moved on the basis of orders and information submitted by Supermarina, thus reversing the direction of the accusations and announcing a detailed report as soon as possible. The report came in the morning of the 13th with expressions like
Contesting also on the basis of these delays, at least an hour and a half had been lost with the team to battle on the wrong route, and two naval aircraft (which the Italian ships were not recoverable but had to head for a stopover friend to mission completed) were launched in the wrong direction. The conclusion was that Since Riccardi could not argue in any way, formally and in writing, Iachino was acquitted of all charges, recognizing that “the operation was conducted with proper criteria and on the basis of a rational appreciation of the situation derived from the news possessed.”
At a subsequent request of the General Staff chaired at the time by Ugo Cavallero, forwarded on the 13th, which read, “ there have been incidents in timely recognition of enemy units. It needs further causes and responsibility. I will be pleased to know the measures taken, “Riccardi had to answer the charging due to adverse weather conditions (non-existent), some drawbacks in the chain of sighting and coordination between aviation and marine,” effectively avoiding the search for culprits in a version of convenience was accepted first by Cavallero and then by Mussolini himself, in a meeting with Riccardi and Iachino in which, as admitted by Riccardi with his subordinate, Mussolini “had been prepared properly.” As a result, no action was taken to improve cooperation between the two arms, and this had a significant influence on the subsequent events, beginning with the events that led to the Battle of Cape Matapan.