Battle of Tarantorefers to an air attack of World War II that occurred during the night between 11 and 12 November 1940.
On that date, the naval fleet of the Royal Italian Navy, stationed in the port of Taranto, suffered severe damage due to a massive aerial bombardment by the fleet of the British Royal Navy.
Battle Of Taranto Introduction
The naval base of Taranto, as well as all the Italian naval bases, was well equipped for the repair of damaged units, thanks mainly to the availability of large dry docks and the presence in its arsenal of all spare parts for machinery and weapons.
However, serious deficiencies were found for everything relating to the protection and anti-aircraft protection of vessels in port - the aircraft batteries were wholly inadequate both in number and as such, and that is compounded by the lack of protection given by the absence of nocturnal radar, so the detection of any hostile aircraft approaching old was assigned to low-flow fixtures, led by aerophones from the First World War.
Regarding the anti-torpedo protection, this was entrusted to the anti-torpedo nets, too few because of the scarcity of raw materials that plagued the Italian industry: in fact, they produced 3600 meters of net per month, to be distributed to all the bases Italian, and 12800 meters commissioned for the protection of vessels moored in the Great Sea just over half had reached its destination, and many had not been lying.
Battle Of TarantoScenario
In August 1940, two new battleships of the Royal Navy entered into service: the mighty battleships Vittorio Veneto and Littorio.
These were 238 meters long, could develop a speed of 30 knots, and had a displacement of 41 300 t standard. The total weight of the armor was only 13 600 t. The armament consisted of nine guns, 381/50 mm placed in three turrets, with 12 guns, 152/55 mm guns, and 12 90/50 mm. There were also 4 guns - 120/40 for illuminating the shot, 20 machine guns from 37/54, and 30 from 20/65 mm.
Two months later, the Italian troops invaded Epirus in the Greek-Italian War, forcing Britain to commit itself militarily on the side of Greece, both to prevent the Italians from controlling the Aegean, thus endangering the safety of Alexandria in Egypt, both to discourage Turkey from entering the war as an ally of the Axis.
This involved a significant increase in the number of British maritime convoys departing from Egypt to allow an ever-increasing supply of war material to the Greek ports and island of Malta, a British strategic stronghold between Sicily and Tunisia, near which transited Italian direct maritime convoys to Libya. The proximity of Taranto to these maneuvers greatly worried the British Admiralty, as the Italian ships that were a basis could easily reach and destroy the British shipping convoys at sea.
Battle Of Taranto Operation Judgment
The Royal Navy, in the person of the Commander in Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet, Admiral Andrew Cunningham, decided to set up an operation to sink or damage the Italian naval units stationed in the base of Taranto, implementing a planned night attack by torpedo bombers designed in 1935 by Admiral Lumley Lyster, at the time of the war in Ethiopia.
The plan was risky and had a lot on the surprise factor, as aircraft would be taken off from the aircraft carrier to accomplish the mission, which is more than 130 miles off the Italian coast, with the risk of being discovered by the enemy.
Furthermore, it had recourse to illuminate the sparse support Bengalieri planes, while the torpedo planes were to fly on the water to circumvent the anti-aircraft batteries and to avoid the torpedoes that sank in the mud of the shallow water. Despite all these precautions, if the Italian ships were stretched out smokescreens, the action would undoubtedly fail.
On the afternoon of November 6, 1940, the operation began: the battleships Malaya, Ramillies, Warspite, and Valiant, the aircraft carrier Illustrious, cruisers Gloucester and York, and 13 destroyers sailed from Alexandria to Malta, near which was stationed the aircraft carrier Eagle.
On November 8, alarmed by these maneuvers in the Mediterranean Sea, the Supreme Command of the Italian Navy dispatched destroyers units, torpedo boats, and submarines on patrol in the Strait of Sicily, while the base of Taranto was made to concentrate the bulk of the Italian naval force.
The British ships reached Malta on November 10, and the next day, the aircraft carrier Illustrious began to move toward the fixed point for the launch aircraft to Taranto. The USS Eagle could not sail because of engine failure: this problem almost halved the number of aircraft available, but was not forced to postpone the raid.
The British reconnaissance aircraft of Taranto took until the evening of 11 November, when the Royal Navy learned that in the two bays in the harbor of Taranto had gathered the battleships Andrea Doria Caio Duilio, Conte di Cavour, Giulio Cesare, Littorio and Vittorio Veneto, the heavy cruisers Bolzano, Fiume, Gorizia, Pola, Trento, Trieste and Zadar, the two light cruisers Louis of Savoy, Duke of Abruzzi and Giuseppe Garibaldi and several destroyers. To quote an expression of Admiral Andrew Cunningham: “All the pheasants were in the nest.”
In defense of the port, 87 barrage balloons were provided, but the bad weather in the previous day had torn 60 and had not yet been able to be replaced because of the lack of hydrogen. Anti-torpedo nets protected naval units, but the 8,600 meters necessary for effective defense had been placed just 4,200 meters.
These networks were still stretched for just 10 meters below sea level, thus leaving a space between the protected network itself and the seabed. Admiral Inigo Samples had also requested that the anti-torpedo nets be placed at a distance from his ship so that he could sail quickly without having to remove the protections.
The attack on Taranto was scheduled for October 21 in honor of the anniversary of the Battle of Trafalgar. Still, technical problems on board disturbed the Illustrious posticiparono attack on November 11.
At 20:30 from the aircraft carrier, Illustrious began operations off the first wave of direct flights to Taranto.
Once the lens was a few minutes before 23:00, they were greeted by a massive barrage. Two bengalieri began throwing flares on the eastern shore of the Great Sea to illuminate the profiles of the targets. In contrast, 6 Fairey Swordfish torpedo bombers began to decline at an altitude of torpedoing. The first aircraft that was shot down dropped a torpedo against the Count of Cavour, squarciandone the left side; two others were aimed against the Andrea Doria but did not hit it.
At the same time, four torpedo bombers, armed with bombs, damaged the destroyer Libeccio and Pessagno, fuel depots bombed and destroyed two seaplanes. At 23:15, two Littorio torpedo bombers attacked simultaneously, hitting both right and left, while the last Swordfish unnecessarily dropped a torpedo against the Vittorio Veneto.
At 23:20, the planes of the first wave receded, but the aircraft came at 23:30 of the second wave. Despite the barrage, a first Swordfish dropped a torpedo against the Caio Duilio, hitting on straight, and two torpedo planes hit the Littorio. Another plane aimed at Vittorio Veneto, which was spared this time, while a second Swordfish was shot down in an attempt to attack the Gorizia.
Finally, one last attack severely damaged the cruiser Trento. The last aircraft was retired at 00:30 on 12 November. The attack on Taranto was terminated. In 90 minutes, the torpedo bombers of the Royal Navy had produced considerable damage, as half of the Italian battleships were put out of action.
The budget was for 58 deaths, 32 of them on Littorio, and 581 injured, six warships damaged (3 - 1 the battleships Cavour in a manner so serious that does not shoot more service-1 cruiser and 2 destroyers), and extensive damage to terrestrial installations. Laconic, for obvious reasons of a military nature, the Supreme Command of the war report n º 158 of 12 November 1940.
“In the early hours of the night on 12, enemy aircraft attacked the naval base of Taranto. Anti-aircraft defense of the square and ships at anchor reacted vigorously. Only one unit has been seriously affected. No Victim ‘ (Bulletin of the Supreme Command of War n º 158 of 12 November 1940).
The outcome of the raid proved especially how big the wrong belief that the torpedo would have hit the ships inside the bases because of shallow water, but especially marked a turning point in the strategies of war at sea, entrusting aviation and aircraft carriers to a significant role in future battles.
During the attack of Taranto, on the evening of 11 November, around 18:00, several British cruisers and destroyers were detached from the main fleet to head toward the Strait of Otranto in order to intercept the Italian traffic to Albania.
The British formation, formed by the light cruisers Orion, Ajax, and Sydney with the escort of the Tribal Class destroyers Nubian and Mohawk, intercepted a convoy to Vlora, made by the steamers Antonio Locatelli, Premuda, Cape Vado, and Catalani, escorted by old destroyer Fabrizi Auxiliary and by the cruiser RAMB III.
The action took place at 01:05 on 12 November, when the English side, after locating the Italian convoy, sank all the ships in spite of the heroic defense of the torpedo boat tender Fabrizi, severely damaged, while the cruiser RAMB III, after an initial exchange of artillery, saving himself disappeared in the port of Brindisi.
In the clash, 36 Italian sailors were killed, 42 were wounded, and 140 sailors were rescued by torpedo boats Curtatone and Solferino. The commander of the torpedo boat, Fabrizi, Lieutenant John Barbini, was awarded the Gold Medal for bravery.
The main effect was that the remaining fleet was moved to Naples. Despite the blow, the Italian navy was not defeated, and he proved the battle of Cape Teulada.