The Battle of Cape Teulada (also known as the Battle of Cape Spartivento) was a minor clash between the forces of the Royal Italian Navy and the Royal British Navy during the Second World War on November 27, 1940.
The Situation Before The Battle
On the night of November 11, the British fleet practically destroyed half of the war power of the Italian fleet with the attack of the Night of Taranto. Up to this point, the Italians were content to leave the fleet in port and use it as a threat against the British fleet (the so-called Fleet in being). After the attack, Italians realized that their fleet was no longer safe in port than at sea combat and began to use the units in war actions.
On the night of 17 November, a task force that included the two Italian battleships Vittorio Veneto and Giulio Cesare, along with other units, tried to intercept the British ships directly to deliver 14 aircraft in Malta Hurricanes and Fulmars. The British convoy was warned of their approach and prematurely reversed the way back to Gibraltar. For this reason, the British forces lost nine planes and seven pilots for lack of fuel before reaching Malta.
This semi-ruined British plan is for an additional convoy of supplies to the island. The convoy was rescheduled with significantly improved defenses, including ships from both Gibraltar (Force H) and Alexandria, Egypt (Force D). The convoy from Gibraltar was spotted by the Italians, who came back to sea to intercept it.
British Units
The Mediterranean Fleet set sail from Alexandria and then made the D Force, consisting of the old battleship Ramillies, by the heavy cruiser Berwick, Newcastle by the light, by the light-aircraft Coventry, and five destroyers: Defender, Gallant, Greyhound, Griffin, and Hereward. The Force H, sailed from Gibraltar under Admiral James Somerville, in turn, was made up of B Force, at its close dependencies, and F Force, led by Vice-Admiral Lancelot Holland.
Force B was part of the battlecruiser Renown and the aircraft carrier Ark Royal and embarked squadrons 800, 803, 810, 818, and 820. The escort was composed of the light cruisers Sheffield and Despatch and the destroyers Faulknor, Firedrake, Forester, Fury, Encounter, Duncan, Wishart, Kelvin, and Jaguar. Force F, then, included the light cruisers Southampton and Manchester, accompanied by the destroyer Hotspur.
The Italian Units
Supermarina directed against the English unit 1st Fleet Admiral Inigo Team Champion, Deputy Chief of Staff, with the battleships Vittorio Veneto, under the command of Captain-Lieutenant Joseph Sparzani, and Julius Caesar, commanded by Captain-Lieutenant Angelo Varoli Square, with escort of destroyers of Squadron VII (Arrow, Lightning, Dart) and XIII (Grenadier, Rifleman, Sharpshooter, and Alpine).
The battleships joined the 2nd Fleet Admiral Angelo Iachino with three heavy cruisers of the 1st Division (Pula, Rijeka, and Gorizia - the Zara was on site to work), escorted by IX Squadron (Alfieri, Oriani, Carducci, and Gioberti). Three of the 3rd Division (Trieste, Trento, and Bolzano) were escorted by the destroyers of Squadron XII (Lancer, Ascari, and Policeman). Samples also proposed to remain at such a distance from Sardinia that would allow him to use the umbrella of the Royal Air Force.
The Air of Sardinia possession of 3 º Group, with 28 fighters Fiat CR.32, and groups of 27 º, 28 º, and 38 º, equipped with bombers Savoia-Marchetti SM79; there were also groups 93 º and 94 º with the reconnaissance seaplanes CANT Z.506 and bombing and the 124 Squadron Air Observation Autonomous with IMAM Ro.37, plus some surveillance and air support of different kinds.
In comparing the two arms, the naval component was decidedly more modern, and between the two marine rivals, the Italian was to have the latest drives.
It should be noted that, on the Italian side, all the units were so busy almost even more efficient than the Royal Navy remained available after the heavy losses suffered as a result of torpedo bombers, which led to the victorious attack against the British naval base of Taranto, where they were anchored, between other, the battleships Littorio and Cavour.
Battle
On 27 November 1940, at 11:45, Somerville was informed of the position of team champions, from which distal about 80 km. The English admiral was concerned about the superiority of Italians, but when, around 12:00, he came into contact with Force D cleared. The Ark Royal could send his torpedo attack with the sun behind him and significantly slow down the movements of Italian ships, which would have been much faster than in England otherwise.
At 12:07, the British cruisers were seen on the horizon the Italian cruisers. The Renown, which proceeded to over 27 knots, had a breakdown and had to reduce speed while other ships were taking positions that qualified for imminent collision. The Italian ships, in turn, after 11:45, are scaglionarono groups at about 30 miles from the head of Teulada. Samples, at 12:07, he thought to disengage, but communication between the larger units and the command was not particularly efficient. Admiral Iachino had already begun to traverse the pieces of his cruisers, while orders from Rome did not appear as clear as they should.
In any case, at 12:22 pm, Admiral Pellegrino Matteucci, commander of the first division on board the river, receiving the order from Iachino that was on Pula, opened fire, immediately imitated by other cruisers, about 23.5 km from enemy units. The Pula and Rijeka concentrated fire on the Berwick, and Berwick, Manchester, Newcastle, and Sheffield pointed their guns at Bolzano, Trento, and Trieste. The Southampton targeted the Pola at 12:24 while the Renown fired six prejudices against Trento from 23.8 km, sailing at 25 knots, wrapping it with the flames of the explosions but without, however, hitting him.
At 12:26, he opened fire on the battleship Ramillies even while the Renown aimed at Bolzano. Communications had no problems and only arrived at 12:30 to Iachino's order not to engage in battle when the dozen had already fired the shots. The destroyer Lancer had a failure that slowed down and cashed three rounds of 152, one of which had knocked out the machines. In his distress, he was so detached that the 3rd Division, protecting it from air and naval attacks, was allowed to take it in tow, bringing it safely to Cagliari.
Soon after, he saw Somerville emerge from the smoke and thought to have two ships in front of the Italian battleships, but they were two French convoys of merchant M, finished somehow in the midst of battle. The staff of Renown noticed it was not time to fire a single shot. Only at 13:00 came within reach of his guns that fired the Vittorio Veneto seven prejudice totaling 19 hits with his songs by 381 mm, without hitting any target. British cruisers were quickly brought out of range.
Somerville did not want to risk a clash with the Italian battleships and decided to retire. Samples followed the same strategy, maintaining a route that led him to move away from the enemy fleet. The battle lasted for 52 minutes, during which the central Italian unit fired 692 shots. The Berwick received two 203 mm rounds, one at 12:22 p.m. and one at 12:35, and had seven killed and a tower out of service.
The Phalanx cannon, but he had received three victims. In consideration of the type and number of units used, the results of the clash were irrelevant. Despite the presence of aircraft surveillance on both sides, there were sightings. The records of the Air Force Command of Sardinia state that enemy ships were attacked, but if this was really true, no bomb found its mark.
In the aftermath of the battle, they distanced themselves from Sardinia; British forces aimed at the Strait of Sicily, and the Italian troops here would have another chance to catch them. However, this task was assigned exclusively to smaller units, i.e., torpedo boats and torpedo boats. From Trapani, Mazara del Vallo and Augusta sailed four and eleven torpedo boats MAS, MAS denounced two mechanical failures and returned to their bases. At 23:24 on 27 November, Sagittarius, and a few minutes after the Sirius, they spotted the units, which they recognized as the British convoy.
The commanders of the two units decided to leave for fear of being spotted. The same thing happened at 00:28 of the day, the 28th, with the torpedo boats Calliope and Vega. The commander of the latter decided to launch two torpedoes at the ships. A torpedo exploded as if it had hit the target, but in fact, no ship was hit.
Also in the same waters sailed submarines Dessie and Tembien, which spotted the British launched against them, on two separate occasions, seven torpedoes, but none hit the target. The torpedo boat MAS sighted some 526 ships, but despite having tried to reach full strength, he could not. The supply convoys and escort ships were able to get it free at the port of La Valletta on November 29 and 30.
The Repercussions
The battle of Cape Teulada was one of several naval battles of WWII that ended without a clear dominance of one over the other, and the General Staffs of the two “Royal Marine” was not involved at all, so Somerville was placed under investigation by a disciplinary committee: his behavior was judged blameless. It was acquitted, but his career came out equally compromised.
Even Benito Mussolini was pleased with the outcome of the battle and, in response, decided to “torpedo” the admiral Cavagnari, putting in place at the top of the Joint Chiefs Admiral Arturo Riccardi. But things did not fare better, despite some successes against significant units of the Royal Navy as an aircraft carrier Illustrious, the battleship Warspite, and cruiser Southampton. Somerville took his revenge on 9 February 1941, when, in command of a squadron, he was able to bombard Genoa without sustaining damage.